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Between
Developed
Countries:
Reflections on the Australia-United
States Free Trade Agreement
William S. Dodge*
ABSTRACT

Free trade agreements between developed countries now
frequently contain provisions on investor protection, but the
resolution of disputes remains problematic. Chapter 11 of the
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) allows
investors to bring direct claims against a host state before an
international tribunal without exhausting domestic remedies.
This has resulted in a number of claims against the United
States by Canadian investors and against Canada by U.S.
investors. Chapter 11 of the Australia-United States Free Trade
Agreement (AUSFTA) does not permit direct claims, relying
instead on a state-to-state dispute resolution mechanism.
This Article reviews the evolution of investment-dispute
resolution from diplomatic protection to NAFTA and AUSFTA.
It suggests that because developed countries have developed
legal systems capable of resolving investment disputes

* Professor of Law, University of California, Hastings College of the Law; Visiting
Fellow, University of New South Wales, Faculty of Law (January to June 2005). My
thanks to Bobby Ahdieh, Andrea Bjorklund, Chip Brower, Bart Legum, Bryan
Mercurio, Michael Van Alstine, and Carlos Vizquez for discussing these issues or for
commenting on an earlier draft.
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expeditiously and without bias, it should be possible to marry
the advantagesof direct claims with those of the local remedies
rule, allowing investors to enforce their own rights under a
treaty but requiringthem to do so in domestic courts first.
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As Sherlock Holmes knew, sometimes the best clue is the dog
that doesn't bark.' In the case of the Australia-United States Free
Trade Agreement (AUSFTA),2 that dog is the mechanism for settling
investor-state disputes. Chapter 11 of AUSFTA, like its North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) 3 counterpart and the
investment chapters of other recent free trade agreements (FTAs),
contains substantial protections for nationals of one signatory country
who invest in the other. 4 In contrast to these other agreements,
however, Chapter 11 of AUSFTA does not allow investors to bring
claims directly against a host government before a panel of
arbitrators. The Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade
explains that "[t]his outcome recognises the fact that both countries
have robust and sophisticated domestic legal systems that provide

1.
See Arthur Conan Doyle, Silver Blaze, in THE COMPLETE SHERLOCK
HOLMES 335 (1927).
2.
Australia-United States Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Austl., May 18, 2004,
118 Stat. 919, available at www.dfat.gov.au/trade/negotitions/us.html [hereinafter
AUSFTA].
3.
North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec. 17, 1992, 32
I.L.M. 289 (1993) [hereinafter NAFTA].
4.
AUSFTA, supra note 2, ch. 11.
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adequate scope for investors, both domestic and foreign, to pursue
concerns about government actions. '5 Foreign investors may not
submit their AUSFTA claims to these "robust and sophisticated
domestic legal systems," however, for in neither the United States nor
Australia may private parties bring suits to enforce AUSFTA. 6 Thus,
the only way of enforcing the agreement's investment provisions is
through Chapter 21's state-to-state dispute settlement provisions, 7 a
throwback to the era of diplomatic protection.
The likely reason for the absence of investor-state dispute
settlement provisions in AUSFTA is a desire to avoid the experiences
of the United States and Canada under NAFTA Chapter 11. NAFTA
Chapter 11 allows investors of one NAFTA party to bring claims
directly against the government of another NAFTA party before an
international panel of arbitrators.8 Moreover, because NAFTA Article
1121 waives the local remedies rule, investors are not required to
exhaust their remedies in domestic court before filing Chapter 11
claims. 9 Although both the United States and Canada had entered
bilateral investment treaties (BITs) providing for immediate, direct
claims by investors before NAFTA, such treaties had always been
with less developed countries that made few investments in their
more developed partners.' 0 The obligations of such treaties are
reciprocal in theory but not in fact, for it is generally only the less
developed country that bears the risk of being sued. 11 NAFTA
Chapter 11 marked the first instance of an investment treaty
between two capital-exporting states allowing for immediate, direct
claims, 12 and both the United States and Canada have been
unpleasantly surprised to find themselves on the receiving end of
13
such claims for the first time.

5.
Australia Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, AUSFTA Frequently
Asked Questions, http://www.dfat.gov.au/trade/negotiations/us-fta/faqs.html [hereinafter
FAQs].
6.
See infra notes 140-46 and accompanying text.
7.
AUSFTA, supra note 2, ch. 21.
8.
NAFTA, supra note 3, ch 11.
9.

See infra notes 104-07 and accompanying text.

10.
Indeed, Professor Sornarajah states that one feature of the BITs "is that
they are treaties between unequal partners." M. SORNARAJAH, THE INTERNATIONAL
LAW ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT 207 (1994).
For lists of BITs by country see
http://www.worldbank.org/icsidltreaties/treaties.htm.
11.
There are, of course, a few exceptions. See, e.g., Maffezini v. Spain, ICSID
Case No. ARB/97/7 (Nov. 13, 2000), 40 I.L.M. 1148 (2001) (awarding damages against
Spain to Argentine investor under Argentina-Spain BIT).
12.
Barton Legum, The Innovation of Investor-State Arbitration Under NAFTA,
43 HARv. INT'L L.J. 531, 537 (2002). Legum cites the Energy Charter Treaty as a
second instance, though one that has not yet given rise to many claims. See id. at 537
n.41.

13.

See Jack J. Coe, Jr., Taking Stock of NAFTA Chapter 11 in its Tenth Year:

An Interim Sketch of Selected Themes, Issues, and Methods, 36 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L.

1381 (2003) (detailing claims under NAFTA).
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As NAFTA and AUSFTA illustrate, the question of how to
resolve investment disputes between developed countries is a vexing
one. 14 Investment agreements between developed countries are
different from those between developed and developing countries in at
least two respects. First, as NAFTA has shown, allowing direct claims
in agreements between developed countries inevitably results in
claims against those countries (although it is difficult to find much
sympathy for developed countries that are simply held to standards
they have long pressed on developing countries). Second, as the
Australian government points out, 15 developed countries have
developed legal systems that are capable of handling international
investment disputes expeditiously and without bias. This Article
suggests that the best way to resolve investment disputes between
developed countries is to marry the advantages of direct claims with
those of the local remedies rule, allowing foreign investors to enforce
their own rights under a treaty but requiring them to do so in
domestic courts first.
Part I reviews the evolution of investment-dispute resolution
from diplomatic protection to the advent of direct investor claims and
BITs. Along the way, it discusses the advantages traditionally
associated with the local remedies rule, as well as some of the
considerations that led to the development of direct claims. Part II
describes the system of dispute resolution established in NAFTA
Chapter 11, with particular attention to the unintended consequences
of waiving the local remedies rule including the impact on state
sovereignty. AUSFTA's quite different system of dispute resolution is
considered in Part III. AUSFTA solves some of the problems of
NAFTA, but only by returning to a system of diplomatic protection
that is unlikely to provide any real help to investors.
Part IV proposes a new system for the resolution of investment
disputes between developed countries that combines the advantages
of direct claims with those of the local remedies rule. Under this
proposal, investors would be permitted to bring both international
and domestic claims directly against a host state, but would have to
bring these claims in the domestic courts of the host state first. Only
after exhausting these domestic remedies would investors have
recourse to an international arbitral tribunal. Such a system would
protect sovereignty, reduce errors, and allow for the resolution of all
claims-international and domestic-in a single forum.

14.
This question is likely to arise again in the context of negotiations between
Canada and the European Union on a Trade and Investment Enhancement
Agreement.
See Canada-European Union Trade and Investment Enhancement
Agreement:
Framework
for the Agreement, http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/tnanac/rb/tiea-en.asp.
15.
See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
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I. FROM

DIPLOMATIC PROTECTION TO

BITs

The resolution of international investment disputes has changed
over the past century or so. Disputes that were once handled only on
a state-to-state basis are now commonly resolved through
arbitrations in which private parties bring their own claims. The
evolution of dispute resolution from diplomatic protection to direct
claims involves two related developments: first, the establishment of
fora for direct claims; and second, the growing use of treaties,
breaches of which might be raised either in those fora or sometimes
even in domestic courts.
A. Diplomatic Protection
The traditional means of obtaining redress for foreign investors
harmed by breaches of international law is known as "diplomatic
protection." 16 The Permanent Court of International Justice in the
Mavrommatis case noted: "It is an elementary principle of
international law that a State is entitled to protect its subjects, when
injured by acts contrary to international law committed by another
State, from whom they have been unable to obtain satisfaction
through the ordinary channels. 1 7 Such protection could take the form
of "consular action, negotiation, mediation, judicial and arbitral
proceedings, reprisals, retorsion, severance of diplomatic relations,
18
economic pressure and, the final resort, the use of force.
Whatever the form, though, diplomatic protection could be
exercised only after the private party had tried and failed to obtain
relief through "ordinary channels"19-that is, through the domestic

16.
Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection, art. 1, UN Doc. A/CN.4/L.647
(INT'L L. COMM'N 2004) ("Diplomatic protection consists of resort to diplomatic action or
other means of peaceful settlement by a State adopting in its own right the cause of its
national in respect of an injury to that national arising from an internationally
wrongful act of another State.") [hereinafter Draft Articles].
17.
Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions (Greece v. U.K.), 1924 P.C.I.J. (ser. A)
No. 2, at 12 (Aug. 30).
18.
International Law Commission, First Report on Diplomatic Protection, 15,
UN Doc. A/CN.4/506 (2000) (prepared by John R. Dugard) [hereinafter First Dugard
Report]; see also FREDRICK SHERWOOD DUNN, THE PROTECTION OF NATIONALS: A
STUDY IN THE APPLICATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 18 (1932).

[Diplomatic protection] embraces generally all cases of official representation
by one Government on behalf of its citizens or their property interests within
the jurisdiction of another, for the purpose, either of preventing some
threatened injury in violation of international law, or of obtaining redress for
such injuries after they have been sustained.
But see Draft Articles, supra note 16, art. 1 (limiting diplomatic protection to means of
"peaceful settlement").
19.

Mavrommatis, 1924 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 2, at 12.
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courts of the host state. "The rule that local remedies must be
exhausted before international proceedings may be instituted is a
well-established rule of customary international law," the
20
International Court of Justice observed in the Interhandel case.
"Before resort may be had to an international court .... it has been
considered necessary that the State where the violation occurred
should have an opportunity to redress it by its own means, within the
'2 1
framework of its own domestic legal system.
The local remedies rule has many advantages. On the most
abstract level, and from the host state's point of view, the rule shows
respect for its "sovereign character." 22 "[T]he right of sovereignty and
independence warrants the local State in demanding for its courts
freedom from interference, on the assumption that they are capable of
doing justice. '2 3 But the host state benefits from the local remedies
rule in more practical ways as well. The rule recognizes that a state
does not exercise complete control over every actor that may engage
its international responsibility and gives the state an opportunity to
redress violations by individuals or low-level officials before the
dispute is taken to an international level.2 4 It generally allows
disputes to be settled at a lower cost to the host state and with less
publicity than an international adjudication. 25 And it protects the
26
host state against at least some abuses of diplomatic protection.
The investor's home state shares with the host state an interest
in avoiding international disputes if possible. 27 The local remedies
rule also relieves the home state of the burden "of espousing claims
that might be resolved at a lower level or which [are] unfounded and

20.
Interhandel Case (Switz. v. U.S.), 1959 LC.J. 5, 27 (Mar. 21). The local
remedies rule is independent of the practice of diplomatic protection, having been
applied during the earlier era of reprisals as well as, more recently, to direct claims by
individuals.

See C.F. AMERASINGHE, LOCAL REMEDIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 22-42

(2d ed. 2004).
21.
Interhandel, 1959 I.C.J. at 27.
22.
23.

AMERASINGHE, supra note 20, at 61.
EDWIN M. BORCHARD, THE DIPLOMATIC PROTECTION OF CITIZENS ABROAD

817 (1915); see also Eduardo Jim6nez de Ar6chaga, International Responsibility, in
MANUAL OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 531, 584 (Max Sorensen ed., 1968) ("The

foundation of the rule is the respect for the sovereignty and jurisdiction of the state
competent to deal with the question through its judicial organs.").
24.
See BORCHARD, supra note 23, at 817 ("[I]f the injury is committed by an
individual or minor official, the exhaustion of local remedies is necessary to make
certain that the wrongful act or denial of justice is the deliberate act of the State.").
25.
AMERASINGHE, supra note 20, at 61.
26.
See Jim6nez de Ar6chaga, supra note 23, at 584 (noting that without the
local remedies rule the alien "could immediately introduce the political influence of his
state of nationality on the slightest difficulty arising with another government").
27.
See BORCHARD, supra note 23, at 817 ("[T]he home Government of the
complaining citizen must give the offending Government an opportunity of doing
justice to the injured party in its own regular way, and thus avoid, if possible, all
occasion for international discussion.").
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frivolous. ' 28 International tribunals may benefit from the rule to the
extent that it lightens their caseloads 29 and, in cases where an
international proceeding cannot be avoided, permits development of
the facts and law involved, particularly domestic law on which the
international tribunal may lack expertise.30 Finally, although the
3
foreign investor derives little benefit from the local remedies rule, ' it
cannot really complain about its application for "the citizen going
abroad is presumed to take into account the means furnished by local
'3 2
law for the redress of wrongs.
Once a foreign investor had exhausted local remedies and its
state had decided to espouse the claim, the dispute underwent a sort
of theoretical "transformation. 3 3 The state was now "asserting its
own rights-its right to ensure, in the person of its subjects, respect
for the rules of international law." 34 The origin of the claim in an
injury to a private interest was now "irrelevant," and the espousing
state became the "sole claimant. 3 5 Of course, this transformation was
a "fiction,"3 6 and the espousing state's claim continued to depend on
the private party in a number of ways: the state could not maintain
its claim unless the private party had exhausted local remedies; 3 7 the
state could not maintain its claim unless the private party still had
the nationality of the espousing state; 38 and damages to the state

28.

AMERASINGHE, supra note 20, at 57.

29.
Id. at 58 ("There may also be an objective contemplated in the relief of
international tribunals from being excessively burdened with litigation.").
30.
Id. at 59; see also Case of Certain Norwegian Loans (Fr. v. Nor.), 1957 I.C.J.
9, 97 (July 6) (dissenting opinion of Judge Read) ("[I]t is important to obtain the ruling
of local courts with regard to the issues of fact and law involved, before the
international aspects are dealt with by an international tribunal.").
31.

See AMERASINGHE, supra note 20, at 61 ("The rule is of little benefit to the

alien if he can obtain quicker, more efficient and cheaper justice through an
international adjudication."). If an international adjudication is not expected to be
quicker, more efficient, and cheaper, a foreign investor is unlikely to pursue it. See id.
32.
BORCHARD, supra note 23, at 817.
33.
International Law Commission, Preliminary Report on Diplomatic
Protection, 5, UN Doc. AICN.4/484 (1998) (prepared by Mohamed Bennouna)
[hereinafter Bennouna Report].
34.
Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions (Greece v. U.K.), 1924 P.C.I.J. (ser. A)
No. 2, at 12 (Aug. 30).
35.
Id.
36.
Bennouna Report, supra note 33, at 7; cf. First Dugard Report, supra note
18, at 7 ("We should not dismiss an institution, like diplomatic protection, that serves a
valuable purpose simply on the ground that it is premised on a fiction and cannot stand
up to logical scrutiny.").
37.
See generally International Law Commission, Second Report on Diplomatic
Protection, UN Doc. A/CN.4/514 (2001) (prepared by John R. Dugard) (discussing
exhaustion of local remedies); International Law Commission, Third Report on
Diplomatic Protection, UN Doc. A/CN.4/523 (2002) (prepared by John R. Dugard)
(discussing exceptions to the general principle that local remedies must be exhausted).
38.
See generally International Law Commission, First Report on Diplomatic
Protection,Addendum, UN Doc. AICN.4/506/Add.1 (2000) (preparedby John R. Dugard)
(discussing requirement of continuous nationality); International Law Commission,
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were measured by the damages to the private party. 39 Nevertheless,
the fiction of the state as claimant had important consequences for it
tended to politicize investment disputes.
One aspect of this politicization was an increase in "international
friction. '40 Professor Hersch Lauterpacht observed that "the espousal
of a claim by the State tends to impart to the complaint the
'4 1
complexion of political controversy and of unfriendly action."
Writing about diplomatic protection, Professor Brierly went so far as
to claim that equating the interests of powerful individuals with the
interests of an entire country was the greatest threat to peace in the
modern world. 42 The political character of diplomatic protection also
meant that power differences inevitably affected the resolution of
investment disputes. Diplomatic protection "came to be seen by
developing nations, particularly in Latin America, as a discriminatory
exercise of power rather than as a method of protecting human
43
rights."
Even for investors from powerful states, diplomatic protection
had its drawbacks, for the espousing state had complete discretion
over the claim. 44 In Barcelona Traction, the International Court of
Justice noted that "[t]he State must be viewed as the sole judge to
decide whether its protection will be granted, and to what extent it is
granted, and when it will cease," a discretion "the exercise of which

Fourth Report on Diplomatic Protection, UN Doc. AICN.4/530 (2003) (preparedby John
R. Dugard) (discussing diplomatic protection of corporations and shareholders).
39.
See Factory at Chorz6w (Merits) (F.R.G. v. Pol.), 1928 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No.
17, at 28 (Sept. 13) ("[R]eparation due by one State to another ... takes the form of an
indemnity for the calculation of which the damage suffered by a private person is taken
as the measure.").
40.
Hersch Lauterpacht, The Subjects of the Law of Nations, 63 L.Q. REv. 438,
454 (1947).
41.
Id.
42.
J.L. Brierly, La Fondement du Charactre Obligatoire du Droit
International,23 RECUEIL DES COURs 468, 531 (1928).
La plus grande menace-et de beaucoup-qu'encoure la paix dans le monde
moderne est la tendance grandissante qu'ont les gouvernements A placer le
pouvoir de l'ttat derri6re les int~r6ts 6conomiques prives de leurs nationaux, et
A identifier ainsi les intdr6ts de quelques individus puissants avec les int6r6ts
de tout le pays.
43.
First Dugard Report, supra note 18, at 5; see also Bennouna Report, supra
note 33, at 3 (noting that "one of the main criticisms of this institution" has been "that
it is in essence discriminatory because only powerful States are able to use it against
weaker States"). In response, Latin American countries developed the Drago Doctrine
(prohibiting the use of force to recover debts) and the Calvo Doctrine (maintaining that
States owed aliens no duties beyond national treatment). See First Dugard Report,
supra note 18, at 17. See generally DONALD R. SHEA, THE CALVO CLAUSE (1955); Amos
S. Hershey, The Calvo and Drago Doctrines, 1 AM. J. INT'L L. 26 (1907).
44.
For a good, recent overview of the hurdles that investors seeking diplomatic
protection face, see Andrea K. Bjorklund, Reconciling State Sovereignty and Investor
Protection in Denial of Justice Claims, 45 VA. J. INT'L L. 1, 12-16 (2005).
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may be determined by considerations of a political or other nature,
unrelated to the particular case. '45 Professor Jessup complained that
"[i]nstances in which the Department of State has declined to press
diplomatic representations on behalf of importunate claimants are
frequent and have often been due, not to the demerits of the claims,
46
but to some overriding policy of fostering friendly relations."
The shortcomings of diplomatic protection led Professor
Lauterpacht to argue for expanding the International Court of
Justice's jurisdiction to allow direct claims by individuals for
violations of international law. 47 In the end, however, it was not the
World Court but the World Bank that provided a forum for direct
claims by foreign investors.
B. Direct Claims
The International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes
(ICSID) was established in 1966 to hear "any legal dispute arising
directly out of an investment, between a Contracting State ... and a
national of another Contracting State, which the parties to the

45.
Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Ltd., 1970 I.C.J. 3, 44 (Feb.
5); see also BORCHARD, supranote 23, at 29.
[I]t is clear that by international law there is no legal duty incumbent upon the
state to extend diplomatic protection. Whether such a duty exists towards the
citizen is a matter of municipal law of his own country, the general rule being
that even under municipal law the state is under no legal duty to extend
diplomatic protection.
RESTATMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 902, cmt. 1 (1987) ("The President
may refuse to present a claim, settle it by negotiation, abandon it, or join it with other
claims for en bloc resolution.").
46.
Philip C. Jessup, Responsibility of States for Injuries to Individuals, 46
COLUM. L. REV. 903, 908 (1946); see also J.L. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 277
(Humphrey Waldock ed., 6th ed. 1963) ("The procedure, too, is far from satisfactory
from the individual's point of view. He has no remedy of his own, and the state to
which he belongs may be unwilling to take up his case for reasons which have nothing
to do with its merits .... "); Brierly, supra note 42, at 531.
C'est tout au mieux une m~thode primitive d'assurer la justice, qui souvent agit
de falon peu satisfaisante pour l'individu lese lui-m~me, car l'tat
auquel il
appartient peut 6tre trop faible pour soutenir sa cause, ou peut pr~f~rer ne le
pas faire pour des raisons politiques 6trang6res au bien-fond6 de la
revendication.
47.
Lauterpacht, supra note 40, at 453-58; see also Jessup, supra note 46, at
910 (favoring "procedural developments in international relations such as the
establishment of special claims commissions to which the individual would have the
right of direct access"); BRIERLY, supra note 46, at 277 (suggesting that "allowing
individuals access in their own right to some form of international tribunal . . . is a
possible reform which deserves to be considered").
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dispute consent in writing to submit to the Centre. ' 48 There were
precedents for allowing direct claims, most significantly the Mixed
Arbitral Tribunals established after the First World War by the
Treaty of Versailles. 49 Unlike earlier mechanisms, however, ICSID
was both permanent and not limited to claims arising from a
particular historical event. Under the ICSID Convention, the
investor's direct claim against the host state was to be exclusive of
any other remedy,50 and an investor's home state was precluded from
exercising diplomatic protection with respect to disputes submitted to
ICSID.5 1
Investors were generally not required to exhaust local remedies
before bringing their claims, although states were permitted under
Article 26 of the ICSID Convention to require exhaustion as a
condition of their consent to arbitration. 52 Waiver of the local
remedies rule was particularly important to investors in developing
countries. The report of the World Bank's executive directors noted
diplomatically that although "investment disputes are as a rule
settled through" domestic channels, "experience shows that disputes

48.
Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and
Nationals of Other States art. 25, 4 I.L.M. 532, 536 (1965) (entered into force Oct. 14,
1966) [hereinafter ICSID Convention].
49.
Treaty of Versailles art. 297, June 28, 1919, 225 Consol. T.S. 188, 328-31,
reprinted in 13 AM. J. INT'L. L. 151, 305-306 (Supp. 1919). Other previous examples
include the Central American Court of Justice, which operated from 1908-1918, the
Arbitral Tribunal established by the Upper Silesia Convention of 1922, and the
Supreme Restitution Court established in 1952 to handle property disputes arising
from the Nazi regime. See Shigeru Oda, The Individual in International Law, in
MANUAL OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 469, 511-13 (Max Sorensen ed., 1968); P.K.
Menon, The International Personality of Individuals in International Law: A
Broadening of the TraditionalDoctrine, 1 J. TRANSNAT'L L. & POLy 151, 158-63 (1992).
Undoubtedly the most important subsequent example is the Iran-United States Claims
Tribunal. See generally David D. Caron, The Nature of the Iran-United States Claims
Tribunal and the Evolving Structure of International Dispute Resolution, 84 AM. J.
INTL L. 104 (1990).
50.
ICSID Convention, supra note 48, art. 26, 4 I.L.M. at 536 ("Consent of the
parties to arbitration under this Convention shall, unless otherwise stated, be deemed
consent to such arbitration to the exclusion of any other remedy.").
51.
Id. art 27(1), 4 I.L.M. at 536.
No Contracting State shall give diplomatic protection, or bring an international
claim, in respect of a dispute which one of its nationals and another
Contracting State shall have consented to submit or shall have submitted to
arbitration under this Convention, unless such other Contracting State shall
have failed to abide by and comply with the award rendered in such dispute.
52.
Id. art. 26, 4 I.L.M. at 536 ("A Contracting State may require the
exhaustion of local administrative or judicial remedies as a condition of its consent to
arbitration under this Convention."). The only Contracting State to have done so by
notification to ICSID was Israel, which later withdrew this condition. CHRISTOPH
SCHREUER, THE ICSID CONVENTION: A COMMENTARY 391 (2001). A few other countries
require exhaustion of local remedies in some of their BITs consenting to ICSID
jurisdiction. See id. at 392 n.137.
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may arise which the parties wish to settle by other methods." 53
Others have been more blunt: "A foreign investor, justifiably in many
instances, will not have confidence in the impartiality of the local
tribunals and courts in settling any disputes that may arise between
him and the host state. ' 54 Providing investors with a more reliable
remedy was expected to "stimulate a larger flow of private
'55
international investment.
Although encouraging international investment was the
"primary purpose" of the ICSID Convention, 56 another advantage was
the "depoliticization" of investment disputes. 57 As Professor Schreuer
explains:
[T]he arbitration procedure provided by ICSID offers considerable
advantages to both sides. The foreign investor no longer depends on the
uncertainties of diplomatic protection but obtains direct access to an
international remedy. The dispute settlement process is depoliticized
and subjected to objective legal criteria ....

In turn, the host State by

consenting to ICSID arbitration obtains the assurance that it will not
be exposed to an international claim by the investor's home
58
State ....

Thus, ICSID's provision for direct claims addressed the shortcomings
of diplomatic protection that Professors Lauterpacht, Brierly, and
59
Jessup had noted.
When the ICSID Convention was drafted, it was expected that
host states would consent to ICSID jurisdiction either through direct
agreements with investors or through domestic legislation.6 0 BITs
had just begun to appear and were barely mentioned in the ICSID
61
Convention's travaux prdparatoires.
BITs soon proliferated,
62
however, and commonly provided for direct claims by investors with
ICSID arbitration as one of the available options. 63 As it has turned

53.
Report of the Executive Directors on the Convention on the Settlement of
Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States, 1 10 (Mar. 18,
1965), 4 I.L.M. 524, 525 [hereinafter Executive Directors' Report].
54.
SORNARAJAH, supra note 10, at 250; see also SCHREUER, supra note 52, at 6
("Rightly or wrongly, the national courts of one of the disputing parties are not
perceived as sufficiently impartial.").
55.
Executive Directors' Report, supra note 53, 12, 4 I.L.M. at 525.
56.
Id.
57.
Ibrahim F.I. Shihata, Towards a Greater Depoliticization of Investment
Disputes: The Roles of ICSID and MIGA, in THE WORLD BANK IN A CHANGING WORLD
309 (1991).
58.

SCHREUER, supra note 52, at 398.

59.
60.

See supra notes 40-47 and accompanying text.
SCHREUER, supra note 52, at 194-210.

61.

Id. at 210.

62.

By the end of 2004, there were 2,392 BITs. U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE

AND DEVELOPMENT, WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 2005: TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS
AND THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF R&D 24 (2005).
63.
SCHREUER, supra note 52, at 210-21.
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out, one of ICSID's principal tasks is now to resolve investment
disputes that arise under treaties.
C. Treaties
The protection of foreign investment by treaty long predates the
BITs. Provisions in modern BITs concerning national treatment,
most-favored-nation treatment, the minimum standard of treatment,
expropriation, and the transfer of proceeds each have antecedents in
nineteenth-century commercial treaties. 64 Between 1923 and 1938,
the United States negotiated a series of Friendship, Commerce, and
Consular Relations Treaties (FCCRs) containing more explicit
protections for foreign investors.6 5 Then, from 1946 to 1966, the
United States concluded a set of Friendship, Commerce, and
Navigation Treaties (FCNs).66 Many of the FCNs, like the FCCRs and
earlier commercial agreements, were concluded with developed
countries, including Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy,
Japan, and the Netherlands.6 7 Although the FCNs showed a good
deal of continuity with their predecessors, 68 one important difference
was the appearance in the FCNs of a provision for the resolution of
disputes, which the United States had previously resisted. 69 Almost
all of the FCNs provided for state-to-state dispute resolution by the
International Court of Justice. 70 In practice, however, state-to-state
dispute resolution under these treaties was exceptionally rare, and

64.
Kenneth J. Vandevelde, The Bilateral Investment Treaty Program of the
United States, 21 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 201, 204-05 (1988); see also ROBERT RENBERT
WILSON, UNITED STATES COMMERCIAL TREATIES AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 104-12
(1960) (discussing property protections in pre-1923 commercial treaties). For a list of
U.S. commercial treaties through 1959, see WILSON, supra at 331-34.
65.
See WILSON, supra note 64, at 113-16; Vandevelde, supra note 64, at 20506.
66.
See WILSON, supra note 64, at 116-22; Vandevelde, supra note 64, at 20608.
67.
See WILSON, supra note 64, at 333-34; see also Vandevelde, supra note 64,
at 207 ("The United States successfully negotiated modern FCN agreements with
major developed countries but had difficulty concluding them with third world states.").
68.
See Herman Walker, Jr., Modern Treaties of Friendship, Commerce, and
Navigation, 42 MINN. L. REV. 805, 807 (1958) (noting that the pattern of FCNs was "of
a kind with its predecessors, and in the same direct line of evolution, having the same
broad design and covering generally the same subject-matter").
69.
WILSON, supra note 64, at 23 ("Prior to World War II, there had been
suggestion of inserting in a commercial treaty a clause binding the parties to
adjudicate disputes concerning interpretation or application, but the United States did
not agree with the suggestion."); see also Herman Walker, Jr., Treaties for the
Encouragement and Protection of Foreign Investment: Present United States Practice, 5
AM. J. COMP. L. 229, 239 (1956) (referring to provision for resolution of disputes as
"signalling the outstanding advances which current treaty policy has effected over that
prevailing in previous years").
70.
One exception was the treaty with Muscat. WILSON, supranote 64, at 24.
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only in the ELSI case did the United States take a claim against
71
another developed country to the International Court of Justice.
Neither the FCNs nor the earlier commercial treaties provided
for direct investor claims, but private parties could sometimes assert
claims under these treaties in domestic court. U.S. courts have held
these commercial treaties to be "self-executing," in the sense that
"they are binding domestic law of their own accord, without the need
for implementing legislation." 72 Private parties have invoked these
treaties in U.S. courts to defend against civil liability,7 3 enjoin
enforcement of a municipal ordinance, 74 compel the issuance of a
certificate of incorporation, 7 5 and claim the right to inherit
76
property.
In the late-1970s, after a hiatus of more than a decade, the
United States launched a new program to expand treaty protections
for foreign investment.7 7 Modeled on treaties that European countries
had been concluding since 1959,78 these BITs differed from the FCNs

71.
See Elettronica Sicula S.p.A. (ELSI) (U.S. v. Italy), 1989 I.C.J. 15 (July 20).
72.
Spiess v. C. Itoh & Co. (America), Inc., 643 F.2d 353, 356 (5th Cir. 1981),
vacated on other grounds, 457 U.S. 1128 (1982) (referring to the 1953 U.S.-Japan
Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation); see also Asakura v. City of Seattle,
265 U.S. 332, 341 (1924) (noting that the 1911 U.S.-Japan Treaty of Commerce and
Navigation "operates of itself without the aid of any legislation, state or national; and it
will be applied and given authoritative effect by the courts"). On the various meanings
of self-execution, see Carlos Manuel Vizquez, The Four Doctrines of Self-Executing
Treaties, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 695 (1995).
73.
See, e.g., Bennett v. Total Minatome Corp., 138 F.3d 1053 (5th Cir. 1998);
Spiess, 643 F.2d 353.
74.
See Asakura, 265 U.S. 332.
75.
See Jordan v. Tashiro, 278 U.S. 123 (1928).
76.
See Kolovrat v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 187 (1961); Hauenstein v. Lynham, 100
U.S. 483 (1879). It is less certain whether private parties may rely on these treaties to
recover damages for expropriation against foreign governments in U.S. courts. A few
courts have held that they may. See Am. Int'l Group, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran,
493 F. Supp. 522, 525 (D.D.C. 1980), modified on othergrounds, 657 F.2d 430 (D.C. Cir.
1981) ("Plaintiffs can assert their rights to recover damages in this Court for violations
of the Treaty [of Amity with Iran]."); see also Kalamazoo Spice Extraction Co. v.
Provisional Military Gov't of Socialist Ethiopia, 729 F.2d 422, 428 (6th Cir. 1984)
(allowing counterclaim for expropriation under 1953 Treaty of Amity and Economic
Relations with Ethiopia). The U.S. government has recently taken the position that
they may not, arguing that private parties lack a cause of action for such claims. See
Brief for the Overseas Private Investment Corp. in Opposition at 12, McKesson HBOC,
Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, Nos. 01-1521, 01-1708, available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/osgfbriefs/2002/Oresponses/2001-1521.resp.pdf
("The
United
States does not interpret the Treaty of Amity to create a private right of action as a
matter of United States law for a United States citizen to sue Iran in the courts of this
country."). In light of the U.S. position, the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit
vacated an earlier decision holding that the Treaty of Amity with Iran created a private
cause of action and remanded that issue to the district court. See McKesson HBOC,
Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 320 F.3d 280, 281 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
77.
Vandevelde, supra note 64, at 208-10.
78.
Id. at 208; see also RUDOLF DOLZER & MARGRETE STEVENS, BILATERAL
INVESTMENT TREATIES 1 (1995) ("The modern BIT is European in origin.").
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and earlier commercial treaties in important ways. First, while
earlier commercial treaties had covered a range of subjects, BITs
focused exclusively on investment. 79 Second, while many of the
earlier treaties were with developed countries, BITs were targeted at
less developed countries.8 0 And third, while the FCNs provided only
for state-to-state dispute resolution and their predecessors did not
mention disputes at all, BITs allowed direct investor claims without
requiring the exhaustion of local remedies.8 1 The first BIT the United
States signed in 1982 provided for ICSID arbitration.8 2 The recently
revised U.S. model BIT offers a menu of alternatives, including: (1)
arbitration under the ICSID Convention if both the host state and the
investor's home state are parties to the Convention; (2) arbitration
under the ICSID Additional Facility Rules if either the host state or
the investor's home state are parties to the Convention; (3)
arbitration under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules; or (4)
arbitration under any other rules to which both the investor and the
83
host state agree.
BITs offered foreign investors the benefits of avoiding domestic
courts in less developed countries and of using a depoliticized process
in which they could press their own claims without intermediation by
their home states.8 4 Because these treaties were with capitalimporting countries, they also created little risk of claims against the
United States. None of the countries with which the United States
has concluded BITs have nationals who are significant investors in
the United States.8 5 While these BITs were reciprocal in theory, they
86
were not in fact.

79.
Vandevelde, supra note 64, at 206.
80.
Id. at 209.
81.
Id. at 256.
82.
Treaty Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of
Investments art. VII, U.S.-Egypt, Mar. 11, 1986, http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/
iialdocslbits/usegypt.pdf
83.
United States 2004 Model BIT, art. 24(3), http://www.state.gov/documents/
organization/38710.pdf; see also DOLZER & STEVENS, supra note 78, at 129 ("[M]ost
modern treaties allow for the possibility of a choice between different arbitral
regimes.").
As noted above, U.S. courts have allowed private parties to rely upon the provisions
of FCNs and earlier commercial treaties. See supra notes 72-76 and accompanying
text. The same should be true of BITs, which contain similar protections phrased in
similar language, although no court seems to have addressed the question to date.
84.
See supra notes 44-46 and accompanying text. Less developed countries
signed these agreements to encourage investment flows in an increasingly competitive
world. See generally Andrew T. Guzman, Why LDCs Sign Treaties That Hurt Them:
Explaining the Popularity of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 38 VA. J. INT'L L. 639
(1998).
85.
The following countries have concluded BITs with the United States,
although not all of these have entered into force: Albania, Argentina, Armenia,
Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belarus, Bolivia, Bulgaria, Cameroon, Congo, Congo
(Brazzaville), Croatia, Czech Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Estonia, Georgia,
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II. NAFTA
Although the United States continues to negotiate BITs,8 7 it has
also moved to incorporate investment chapters in its FTAs. The
United States' first FTA, which was concluded with Israel in 1985,
contained no investment provisions besides a prohibition of
performance requirements."8 In negotiating the 1988 Canada-United
States Free Trade Agreement, however, the United States pressed
hard to include a chapter on investment, partly in hopes of setting a
precedent for the Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations.8 9 Although
Canada initially resisted, it ultimately gave way. 90 Chapter 16 of the
Canada-U.S. FTA contained investor protections similar to those in
U.S. BITs, but without any provision for direct investor claims. 9 1
Breaches of these provisions could be raised only in state-to-state
dispute settlement under the terms of Chapter 18.92
This changed when Canada and the United States came to
negotiate an expanded FTA that would include Mexico. Mexico had
never before signed an investment treaty, and the United States was
determined to see that NAFTA included an investment chapter.
NAFTA Chapter 11 followed the basic outlines of the U.S. model BIT,
allowing investors from one NAFTA party to bring claims directly

Grenada, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia,
Lithuania, Moldova, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Panama, Poland,
Romania, Russia, Senegal, Slovakia, Sri Lanka, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey,
Ukraine, Uruguay, and Uzbekistan. See Fact Sheet, U.S. Bilateral Investment Treaty
Program, http://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/fs/22422.htm [hereinafter U.S. BIT Fact Sheet].
86.
There were efforts in the 1990s to negotiate a multilateral agreement on
investment among the members of the OECD, which would have allowed direct claims
and thus exposed the United States to claims by investors from other capital-exporting
States.
See THE MAI NEGOTIATING TEXT 70--76 (as of Apr. 24, 1998),
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/46/40/1895712.pdf.
For a discussion of the failure of
these negotiations, see Peter T. Muchlinski, The Rise and Fall of the Multilateral
Agreement on Investment: Where Now?, 34 INT'L LAW. 1033 (1999).
87.
The United States and Uruguay signed a BIT on Oct. 25, 2004. See U.S.
BIT Fact Sheet, supra note 85.
88.
See Agreement on the Establishment of a Free Trade Area art. 13, U.S.-Isr.,
Apr. 22, 1985, 24 I.L.M. 653, 662.
89.
See Jean Raby, The Investment Provisions of the Canada-UnitedStates Free
Trade Agreement: A Canadian Perspective, 84 AM. J. INT'L L. 394, 403 (1990). The
Uruguay Round did produce an agreement on investment, the Trade-Related
Investment Measures Agreement (TRIMS), but its substantive provisions are limited
and, like other World Trade Organization (WTO) agreements, it does not allow for
claims by private parties. See generally MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK & ROBERT HOWSE,
THE REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE 351-53 (2d ed. 1999) (discussing TRIMS).
90.
See Raby, supra note 89, at 405-09.
91.
See Free Trade Agreement ch. 16, Can.-U.S., Jan. 2, 1988, 27 I.L.M. 281,
373-80 (1988). Canada had not concluded any BITs prior to the Canada-U.S. FTA. See
ICSID, Bilateral Investment Treaties: Canada, http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/
treaties/canada.htm [hereinafter Canada BITs]. It signed its first BIT with the
Russian Federation on November 20, 1989. See id.
92.
See Free Trade Agreement, supra note 91, ch. 18.
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against the government of another NAFTA party. 93 Between the
signing of the Canada-U.S. FTA and the end of the NAFTA
negotiations, Canada had also concluded five BITs providing for
direct claims by investors, 94 which made it more difficult for Canada
to resist similar provisions in NAFTA. 95 None of the countries with
which Canada and the United States had signed BITs had significant
investments in their developed partners, but Canada and the United
96
States had made enormous investments in each other's economies.
And while the novelty of an investment agreement between two
developed economies was noted at the time, 9 7 its implications were
not fully appreciated.
Canada and the United States soon found themselves to be
respondents in a number of claims filed by the other's investors. As of
this writing, Canada has lost two cases to U.S. investors9" and has
settled a third. 99 A fourth is pending. 10 0 Eleven cases have been filed

93.
See NAFTA, supra note 3, ch. 11; see also North American Free Trade
Agreement Implementation Act Statement of Administrative Action, H.R. Doc. No.
103-159, at 145 (1993) (noting that Chapter 11 arbitration "is patterned after the
investor-State dispute settlement mechanism of the standard U.S. bilateral investment
treaty").
94.
See Canada BITs, supra note 91 (listing agreements with Russia, Poland,
the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Argentina).
95.
One of the Chapter 11 negotiators has recounted:
I remember at one point during the negotiations that Canada was resisting
particular provisions that the United States and Mexico were urging. It was
discovered that these very same provisions appeared in Canada's bilateral
investment treaty with the then-Soviet Union. And the question raised to the
Canadian Minister was, Is it really your position that you will treat investors
from the Soviet Union more favorably than you will treat investors from either
the United States or Mexico?
Daniel M. Price, Chapter 11 Investor-State Dispute Settlement: Frankensteinor Safety
Valve?, 26 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 107, 108 (2000).
96.
According to Canadian government statistics, at the end of 1993 Canadian
investment in the United States exceeded C$67 billion, while U.S. investment in
Canada exceeded C$90 billion. See Foreign Direct Investment and Canadian Direct
Investment Abroad (May 2004), http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/eetpdf/CIIPO3-en.pdf. By
the end of 2003, these figures had risen to C$164 billion and C$228 billion,
respectively. Id.
97.
See Daniel M. Price, An Overview of the NAFTA Investment Chapter:
Substantive Rules and Investor-StateDispute Settlement, 27 INT'L LAW. 727, 736 (1993)
(noting that Chapter 11 "represents the first occasion when two developed OECD
countries have made the same commitments to each other that they have demanded of
developing countries").
98.
See Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Canada, Award on Damages (NAFTA Ch. 11 Arb.
Trib., May 31,
2002), http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.caltna-nac/documents/damageaward.pdf; S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Canada, Award on Damages (NAFTA Ch. 11 Arb. Trib.,
Oct. 21, 2002), http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/tna-nac/documentsMyersPA.pdf.
99.
See Dispute Settlement: Ethyl Corp. v. Canada, http://www.dfaitmaeci.gc.ca/tna-nac/ethyl-en.asp.
100.
See Dispute Settlement: United Parcel Serv. of Am., Inc. v. Canada,
http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/tna-naclparcel-en.asp.
The Canadian government's
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against the United States by Canadian investors. 10 1 The United
States has won all four of the cases decided thus far,1 0 2 though it
10 3
prevailed in Loewen only on the basis of technicalities.
Although both Canada and the United States have well
developed legal systems, 0 4 NAFTA Chapter 11 does not require
investors to exhaust local remedies before filing claims against those
countries. 10 5 Instead Article 1121 requires investors to "waive their
right to initiate or continue before any administrative tribunal or
court under the law of any Party, or other dispute settlement
procedures, any proceedings with respect to the measure of the
disputing Party that is alleged to be a breach ....,,106 The
proceedings that must be waived include those alleging only breaches

website lists an additional eight cases in which notices of intent were received but in
which no claims were submitted. See Dispute Settlement, NAFTA-Chapter iiInvestment, Cases Filed Against the Gov't of Canada, http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/tnanac/gov-en.asp.
101.
See http://www.state.gov/s/l/c3741.htm.
102.
See Mondev Int'l Ltd. v. United States, Award, (NAFTA Ch. 11 Arb. Trib.
Oct. 11, 2002), http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/16586.pdf; ADF Group,
Inc. v. United States, Award (NAFTA Ch. 11 Arb. Trib. Jan 9, 2003),
http://www.state.gov/documents/ organization/16586.pdf; Loewen Group, Inc. v. United
States, Award (NAFTA Ch. 11 Arb. Trib. June 26, 2003), 42 I.L.M. 811 (2003),
http://www.state.gov/documents /organization22094.pdf; Methanex Corp. v. United
States, Final
Award
(NAFTA
Ch.
11
Arb. Trib.
Aug.
3,
2005),
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/51052.pdf.
103.
See William S. Dodge, International Decisions: Loewen Group, Inc. v.
United States and Mondev International Ltd. v. United States, 98 AM. J. INT'L L. 155,
157-58 (2004).
104. Cf. Bernardo Sepulveda Amor, International Law and National
Sovereignty: The NAFTA and the Claims of Mexican Jurisdiction,19 HOUS. J. INT'L L.
565, 581 (1997) ('Mexico has its own juridical order capable of giving full satisfaction to
the obligations contained in the NAFTA-including, of course, those in Chapter 11.").
For a suggestion about what to do when the courts of the parties to an investment
agreement inspire different levels of confidence, see infra note 210.
105. Although waiver of the local remedies rule is not express, Chapter 11
tribunals have generally held that it is properly inferred from Article 1121. See
Feldman v. Mexico, Award (NAFTA Ch. 11 Arb. Trib. Dec. 16, 2002), 42 I.L.M. 625, 639
(2003) ("Article 1121(2)(b) and (3) substitutes itself as a qualified and special rule on
the relationship between domestic and international judicial proceedings, and a
departure from the general rule of customary international law on the exhaustion of
local remedies."); Waste Mgmt., Inc. v. Mexico, Mexico's Preliminary Objection
Concerning the Previous Proceedings (NAFTA Ch. 11 Arb. Trib. June 26, 2002), 41
I.L.M. 1315, 1321 (2002) ("In common with almost all investment treaties, there is no
requirement of exhaustion of local remedies."); Metalclad Corp. v. Mexico, Award,
(NAFTA Ch. 11 Arb. Trib. Aug. 30, 2000), 40 I.L.M. 36, 49 n.4 (2001) ('Mexico does not
insist that local remedies must be exhausted. Mexico's position is correct in light of
NAFTA Article 1121(2)(b) ...."). But see Loewen Group, 42 I.L.M. at 838 ("Article
1121 involves no waiver of the duty to pursue local remedies in its application to a
breach of international law constituted by a judicial act."). For a discussion of the issue
that predated these awards, see William S. Dodge, National Courts and International
Arbitration: Exhaustion of Remedies and Res Judicata Under Chapter Eleven of
NAFTA, 23 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 357, 373-76 (2000).
106.
NAFTA, supra note 3, arts. 1121(1)(b), 1121(2)(b).
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of domestic law. 10 7 Subject to Chapter 11's three-year statute of
limitations, an investor is free to pursue domestic remedies before it
files a Chapter 11 claim,108 but ultimately it must choose between
national courts and international arbitration.
This choice is not made any easier by the fact that no single
forum has jurisdiction over both Chapter 11 and domestic-law claims.
The jurisdiction of Chapter 11 tribunals extends only to breaches of
Chapter 11 and customary international law,' 0 9 while U.S. and
Canadian courts are prohibited by NAFTA's implementing legislation
from hearing private causes of action or defences based on the
agreement. 110 But in the real world, issues of domestic law are

107.
See Waste Mgmt., Inc. v. Mexico, Arbitral Award (NAFTA Ch. 11 Arb. Trib.
June 2, 2000), 40 I.L.M. 56, 66 (2001) ("[T]he waiver required under NAFTA Article
1121 calls for a show of intent by the issuing party vis-A-vis its waiver of the right to
initiate or continue any proceedings whatsoever before other courts or tribunals with
respect to the measure allegedly in breach of the NAFTA provisions.").
108.
See NAFTA, supra note 3, art. 1116(2) ("An investor may not make a claim
if more than three years have elapsed from the date on which the investor first
acquired, or should have first acquired, knowledge of the alleged breach and knowledge
that the investor has incurred loss or damage."); id. art. 1117(2).
An investor may not make a claim on behalf of an enterprise described in
paragraph 1 if more than three years have elapsed from the date on which the
enterprise first acquired, or should have first acquired, knowledge of the
alleged breach and knowledge that the enterprise has incurred loss or damage.
109.
See id., art. 1131(1) ("A Tribunal established under this Section shall decide
the issues in dispute in accordance with this Agreement and applicable rules of
international law."); see also Azinian v. Mexico, Award (NAFTA Ch. 11 Arb. Trib. Nov.
1, 1999), 39 I.L.M. 537, 549 (2000) ("Arbitral jurisdiction under Section B is
limited ... as to subject matter: claims may not be submitted to investor-state
arbitration under Chapter Eleven unless they are founded upon the violation of an
obligation established in Section A."); ADF Group, Inc. v. United States (NAFTA Ch. 11
Arb. Trib. Jan. 9, 2003) 190, http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/ 16586.pdf
("[Tihe Tribunal has no authority to review the legal validity and standing of the U.S.
measures here in question under U.S. internal administrative law. Our jurisdiction is
confined by NAFTA Article 1131(1) to assaying the consistency of the U.S. measures
with relevant provisions of NAFTA Chapter 11 and applicable rules of international
law."); Waste Mgmt., Inc. v. Mexico, Final Award (NAFTA Ch. 11 Arb. Trib. Apr. 30,
2004), 43 I.L.M. 967, 989 (2004) ("NAFTA Chapter 11 is not a forum for the resolution
of contractual disputes.").
110.
North American Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act § 102(c)(1),
Pub. L. No. 103-182 (codified at 19 U.S.C.A. § 3312(c)(1)) [hereinafter NAFTA
Implementation Act] ("No person other than the United States ... shall have any cause
of action or defense under the [NAFTA] .... ); id. § 102(c)(2) (codified at 19 U.S.C.A. §
3312(c)(2)).
No person other than the United States . . . may challenge, in any action
brought under any provision of law, any action or inaction by any department,
agency, or other instrumentality of the United States, any State, or any
political subdivision of a State on the ground that such action or inaction is
inconsistent with the [NAFTA] ....
North American Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act § 6(2), 1993 Consolidated
Statutes of Canada, c. 44.
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frequently intertwined with Chapter 11 claims. Whether a concession
contract was expropriated may depend on whether the government
had legitimate grounds to repudiate it under domestic law.'
Whether the denial of a municipal construction permit violated the
international minimum standard of treatment may depend on
whether the permitting authority had jurisdiction over environmental
matters. 112 And a foreign investor who waives its domestic remedies
to pursue a Chapter 11 claim may find in the end that the local
government's misconduct violated only domestic law and could only
113
have been pursued in a domestic forum.
One supposed reason for not allowing U.S. courts to hear treaty
claims is to protect state sovereignty, 1 14 but in the NAFTA context
such protection has proved illusory. Prohibitions against private
causes of action and related provisions have been included in
legislation implementing U.S. trade agreements since 1979.11

Subject to Section B of Chapter Eleven of the Agreement, no person has any
cause of action and no proceedings of any kind shall be taken, without the
consent of the Attorney General of Canada, to enforce or determine any right or
obligation that is claimed or arises solely under or by virtue of the Agreement.
An investor may raise a breach of Chapter 11 in Mexican court, but doing so precludes
the investor from subsequently bringing its claim before a Chapter 11 tribunal. See
NAFTA, supra note 3, annex 1120.1(a) ("[An investor of another Party may not allege
that Mexico has breached an obligation under [NAFTA] . . . both in an arbitration
under this Section and in proceedings before a Mexican court or administrative
tribunal....").
111.
See, e.g., Azinian, 39 I.L.M. at 551-55 (noting that the invalidity or proper
rescission of a concession contract under Mexican law would defeat a claim that the
concession was expropriated).
112.
See, e.g., Metalclad Corp. v. Mexico, Award, (NAFTA Ch. 11 Arb. Trib. Aug.
30, 2000), 40 I.L.M. 36, 48-49 (2001) (concluding that denial of municipal construction
permit for hazardous waste landfill on the basis of environmental concerns breached
Article 1105 when Mexican law gave the federal government exclusive authority over
the regulation of hazardous wastes).
113.
See, e.g., Waste Mgmt., 43 I.L.M. 967.
114.
See MICHELLE SAGER, ONE VOICE OR MANY? FEDERALISM AND
INTERNATIONAL TRADE 122 (2002) (noting that during the negotiation of NAFTA and
the Uruguay Round "[t]he preservation of federalism emerged as a key ingredient for
continued state support for trade liberalization"). For a good account of state efforts to
preserve sovereignty under NAFTA and GATT, see id. at 89-123.
115.
These provisions have evolved over time.
Section 3 of the Trade
Agreements Act of 1979 provided that U.S. law was to prevail in the event of a conflict
with GATT and prohibited private causes of action under the agreement unless
Congress explicitly provided otherwise. See Trade Agreements Act of 1979, Pub. L. No.
96-39, § 3(a) & (f), 93 Stat. 144 (1979). Section 5 of the United States-Israel Free
Trade Area Implementation Act of 1985 was virtually identical. See U.S.-Israel Free
Trade Area Implementation Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-47, § 5(a) & (d), 99 Stat. 82
(1985).
Section 102 of the United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement
Implementation Act of 1988 repeated these provisions and added others concerning
state law, providing that the FTA would prevail over inconsistent state law but that
only the United States could challenge state law as inconsistent with the agreement.
See U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-
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Indeed, the U.S. House of Representative's report on NAFTA's
implementing legislation noted that its limitations were "consistent
with the Trade Agreements Act of 1979 implementing the Tokyo
Round of multilateral trade negotiations, the U.S.-Israel Free Trade
Area Implementation Act of 1985, and the U.S.-Canada FTA
Implementation Act of 1988."116 This citation of precedents, however,
masks an important difference. None of these other agreements
provided private parties an alternative forum in which to bring
claims. 117 In the case of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT) and the earlier FTAs, the effect of precluding private causes
of action was to give the United States a monopoly over enforcement
of the agreement. NAFTA Chapter 11, by contrast, did allow
investors to bring claims to enforce the agreement. The effect of these
same implementing provisions in the context of NAFTA, then, was
not to prevent private claims alleging that state and local laws
violated the agreement, but instead to direct these claims into an
international rather than a domestic forum.
Of the eleven NAFTA cases filed against the United States, five
have alleged breaches by state or local governments.1 18 Although
these claims are brought against the United States, rather than the
states, and any damages awarded would come in the first instance
from the federal treasury, state and local officials have expressed
concern. 119 The National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL)
has sought assurances "that the federal government will not shift the
cost of compensation under a Chapter 11 award to states whose

449, § 102(b)(1) & (3), 102 Stat. 1851 (1988). These provisions were then incorporated
in Section 102 of the North American Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act and
in Section 102 of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act. See Pub. L. No. 103-465, § 102,
108 Stat. 4809 (1994) (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 3512). They have also been included in
the implementing legislation for every subsequent FTA.
There are also parallels in the non-self-execution declarations the United States
has made with respect to human rights treaties since the late 1970s. See Curtis A.
Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Treaties, Human Rights, and Conditional Consent, 149
U. PA. L. REV. 399, 419-22 (2000).
116.
H.R. Rep. No. 103.361, pt. 1, at 18, (1993), reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2552, 2568.
117.
GATT dispute resolution, both before and after the Uruguay Round, was
limited to state parties, and as noted above neither the U.S.-Israel nor the U.S.-Canada
FTAs allowed direct investor claims. See supra notes 88-92 and accompanying text.
118.
See U.S. Dept. of State, Cases Filed Against the United States of America,
http://www.state.gov/s/l/c3741.htm (indicating that the cases alleging breaches by state
or local government are Glamis Gold Ltd., Grand River Enterprises Six Nations Ltd.,
Loewen Group, Inc., Methanex Corp., and Mondev InternationalLtd.).
119.
See, e.g. Letter from National Conference of State Legislatures, National
League of Cities, and National Association of Towns and Townships to Chuck Grassley,
Chairman, Senate Finance Committee (Apr. 12, 2005), http://www.ncsl.org/standcomm/
scecon/grassleyletter041205.htm ('The interplay of state and local judicial authorities
and jurisdictions and the quasi-juridical, ad hoc bodies created to consider investorstate disputes continues to trouble our members.").
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measures are challenged and will not withhold federal funds
otherwise appropriated by the Congress to a state as a means of
enforcing compliance with provisions of NAFTA."'120 The NCSL has
also asked the federal government not to "seek to preempt state law
as a means of enforcing compliance with NAFTA without expressly
stated intent to do so by the Congress.' 12 1 The federal government
has provided only the latter assurance. 122 Available documents reflect
12 3
some state assistance in defending claims based on state measures,
but ultimately it is the federal government of the United States that
makes the decisions about how to defend such claims. 124 Ironically,
the federalism protections found in NAFTA's implementing
legislation have not worked to protect state sovereignty but have
instead exposed state laws to international claims without allowing
the states to control the defence of those claims. As will be seen
below, AUSFTA does protect the states from similar challenges, but
only at the expense of making its investment protections largely
unenforceable.

120.
Nat'l Conference of State Legislatures, Economic Development, Trade and
Cultural Affairs Committee, 2004-2005 Policy on the North American Free Trade
Agreement, http://www.ncsl.org/statefed/EconDev.htm#NAFTA
[hereinafter NCSL
NAFTA Policy].
121.
Id.
122.
See Ambassador Peter F. Allgeier, Acting U.S. Trade Rep., Remarks at the
Nat'l Conference of State Legislatures: Trade Agreements and the States 2 (Apr. 16,
2005), available at http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Document-Library/USTR-ZoellickSpeeches/2005/assetuploadfile62_7628.pdf.
Trade agreements do not restrict a state's right to regulate and do not
automatically

pre-empt,

invalidate

or overturn

state

laws

. . . .

And

international panels set up to look at disputes over trade agreements have no
authority to change U.S. law or to require any state or local government to
change its laws or decisions. Only the federal or state governments can change
a federal or state law.
123.
See Grand River Enter. v. United States, Minutes of the First Session of the
Tribunal, 2 (Mar. 31, 2005) (NAFTA/UNCITRAL Arbitration), http://www.state.gov/
documents/organization/45017.pdf (listing William Lieblich, Nat'l Assoc. of Attorneys
General, as assisting respondent); Methanex Corp. v. United States, Final Award, pt.
II, ch. A, 2-3 (NAFTA Ch. 11 Arb. Trib. Aug. 3, 2005), http://www.state.gov/documents/
organizationI51052.pdf (noting that representatives of California attended oral
meetings and hearings and "worked closely with the USA in formulating the USA's
case"). NCSL has asked for "the right of attorneys for the state to participate as part of
the 'team' defending a state law before international tribunals." Nat'l Conference of
State Legislatures, Economic Development, Trade and Cultural Affairs Committee,
2004-2005 Policy on Free Trade and Federalism, http://www.ncsl.org/statefed/
EconDev.htm#freetrade [hereinafter NCSL Free Trade Policy].
124.
State representatives are not listed on any of the briefs or pleadings filed by
the United States in any of the five cases noted above. Briefs and pleadings are
available at http://www.state.gov/sfl/c3741.htm.
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III. AUSFTA
The Australia-United States FTA was signed on May 18, 2004,
and entered into force on January 1, 2005.125 Chapter 11 of AUSFTA
covers investment and includes essentially the same substantive
provisions as NAFTA Chapter 11, although some key differences
126
show that the negotiators took the NAFTA experience into account.
What distinguishes AUSFTA from NAFTA is its lack of a provision
for direct investor claims. 12 7 Enforcement of AUSFTA Chapter 11 is
limited to the state-to-state dispute settlement procedures set forth in
Chapter 21.128 Moreover, it seems likely that an investor would have

125.
Press Release, Office of the United States Trade Rep., Landmark U.S.Australia Free Trade Agreement Goes into Effect Today (Jan. 1, 2005), available at
http://www.ustr.gov/DocumentLibrary/PressReleases/2005/JanuaryLmarkU.S.AustraliaFreeTrade AgreementGoesIntoEffectLToday.html.
126.
To give two examples, AUSFTA Article 11.5's minimum standard of
treatment provides for "treatment in accordance with the customary international law
minimum standard of treatment of aliens" (emphasis added) and states explicitly that
"[a] determination that there has been a breach of another provision of this Agreement,
or of a separate international agreement, does not establish that there has been a
breach of this Article." AUSTFA, supra note 2, art. 11.5. The analogous provision of
NAFTA, Article 1105, used the more ambiguous phrase "treatment in accordance with
international law," leading some NAFTA tribunals to conclude that breach of another
provision of NAFTA would constitute a breach of article 1105 as well. See William S.
Dodge, InternationalDecisions: Metalclad Corp. v. Mexico and Mexico v. Metalclad
Corp., 95 AM. J. INT'L L. 910, 916 (2001).
AUSFTA also includes an interpretive Annex 11-B on expropriation specifying that
"[e]xcept in rare circumstances, non-discriminatory regulatory actions by a Party that
are designed and applied to achieve legitimate public welfare objectives, such as the
protection of public health, safety, and the environment, do not constitute indirect
expropriations." AUSFTA, supra note 2, annex 11-B(4)(b). This largely closes the door
to regulatory expropriation claims that awards like Metalclad had opened. See
Metalclad Corp. v. Mexico, Award, (NAFTA Ch. 11 Arb. Trib. Aug. 30, 2000), 40 I.L.M.
36, 50 (2001).
Thus, expropriation under NAFTA includes not only open, deliberate and
acknowledged takings of property, such as outright seizure or formal or
obligatory transfer of title in favour of the host State, but also covert or
incidental interference with the use of property which has the effect of
depriving the owner, in whole or in significant part, of the use or reasonably-tobe-expected economic benefit of property even if not necessarily to the obvious
benefit of the host State.
127.
Article 11.16 provides only for future consultations concerning the
development of investor-state dispute settlement if "there has been a change in
circumstances affecting the settlement of disputes on matters within the scope of this
Chapter." AUSFTA, supra note 2, art. 11.16.
128.
Chapter 21 provides in the first instance for consultations between the
state parties, id. art. 21.5, and referral to the standing Joint Committee established by
the agreement, id. art. 21.6. If these fail to resolve the dispute, it may be taken to a
dispute settlement panel of three. Id. art. 21.7. The panel may determine if the
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to exhaust its domestic remedies before Chapter 21's procedures could
129
be invoked.
AUSFTA's failure to provide for direct investor claims does not
represent a rejection of such claims more generally by either the
United States or Australia. Between NAFTA and AUSFTA, the
United States negotiated FTAs with Singapore, Chile, Morocco, and
the CAFTA-DR countries1 3 0 providing for investor-state dispute
settlement, 131 as well as BITs with an additional twenty-one
countries 132 allowing for direct claims. Australia has only recently
started to negotiate FTAs, 13 3 but its FTAs with Singapore and
Thailand each include provisions for investor-state dispute
resolution, 134 as do Australia's many BITs with developing
countries.135

measure at issue is a breach of the agreement but does not award damages. Id. art.
21.9. Compensation seems to be contemplated only if the breaching state refuses to
implement the panel's report and even then must be negotiated by the parties. Id. art.
21.11.1. The ultimate sanction is suspension of benefits under the agreement, the
amount of which the panel may determine. Id. art. 21.11.2-7.
129.
In the ELSI case, a Chamber of the ICJ held a provision in the Italy-U.S.
FCN providing for the resolution of disputes between the two States was insufficient to
waive the local remedies rule, stating that it was "unable to accept that an important
principle of customary international law should be held to have been tacitly dispensed
with, in the absence of any words making clear an intention to do so." Elettronica
Sicula S.p.A. (ELSI) (U.S. v. Italy), 1989 I.C.J. 15, 42 (July 20). There is no provision
in Chapter 11 or Chapter 21 of AUSFTA analogous to Article 1121 of NAFTA, which
NAFTA tribunals have found to waive the exhaustion requirement. See supra notes
104-07 and accompanying text.
130.
Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, and the
Dominican Republic.
131.
See Free Trade Agreement, ch. 10, U.S.-Sing., May 6, 2003, available at
http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade -Agreements/Bilateral/Singapore-FTA/Final-Texts/as
set_uploadfile708_4036.pdf; Free Trade Agreement, ch. 10, U.S.-Chile, June 6, 2003,
available at http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade Agreements/Bilateral/ChileFTA/Final_
Texts/asset-upload filel _4004.pdf; Free Trade Agreement, ch. 10, U.S.-Morocco, June
16, 2004, available at http://www.ustr.gov/assets/TradeAgreements/Bilateral/Morocco_
FTA/FInalText/asset.upload-file651_3838.pdf; Free Trade Agreement, ch. 10, Cen.
Am.-Dom. Rep.-U.S., Aug. 8, 2004, available at http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade_
Agreements/Bilateral/CAFTA/CAFTA-DRFinalTexts/asset upload-file328_4718.pdf.
132.
Albania, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Belarus, Bolivia, Croatia, El Salvador,
Estonia, Georgia, Honduras, Jamaica, Jordan, Latvia, Lithuania, Mongolia,
Mozambique, Nicaragua, Trinidad and Tobago, Ukraine, Uruguay, and Uzbekistan.
See U.S. BIT Fact Sheet, supra note 85.
133.
See Bryan Mercurio, Should Australia Continue Negotiating BilateralFree
Trade Agreements? A PracticalAnalysis, 27 UNSW L.J. 667 (2004).
134.
Free Trade Agreement, ch. 8, art. 14, Sing.-Austl., Feb, 17, 2003, available
at http://www.dfat.gov.au/trade/negotiations/aust-thai/aus-that-FTA-text.pdf;
Free
Trade Agreement,
art.
917,
Austl-Thail,
July
5,
2004,
available at
http://www.dfat.gov.au/trade/negotiations/aust-thai/aus-thai_FrA -text.pdf.
135.
UNCTAD lists BITs between Australia and the following countries:
Argentina, Chile, China, Czech Republic, Egypt, Hungary, Lithuania, Pakistan,
Philippines, Poland, India, Indonesia, Hong Kong, Laos, Papua New Guinea, Peru,
Romania, Sri Lanka, Uruguay, and Vietnam. See U.N. Conference on Trade and
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Because little investment from these countries flows into either
the United States or Australia, these other agreements pose little risk
of direct investor claims against the Australian and U.S.
governments. The investment relationship between the United States
and Australia is quite different. According to Australia's Department
of Foreign Affairs and Trade, the United States is the largest foreign
investor in Australia, supplying nearly thirty percent of its foreign
investment, while Australia is the tenth largest foreign owner of U.S.
assets. 13 6 In 2002, U.S. investment in Australia was valued at
US$36.3 billion, on a historical-cost basis, while Australian
13 7
investment in the United States was valued at US$24.5 billion.
Given these levels of investment, allowing direct claims under
AUSFTA would inevitably have led to a repetition of the Canadian
and U.S. experience under NAFTA.
Of course, neither Australia nor the United States explained the
absence of investor-state dispute resolution in terms of a desire not to
be sued. The Australian government said "[t]his outcome recognises
the fact that both countries have robust and sophisticated domestic
legal systems that provide adequate scope for investors, both
domestic and foreign, to pursue concerns about government
actions. 13 8 The United States took the same line, though it seemed
less pleased with the result and more concerned not to set a
precedent:
In recognition of the unique circumstances of this Agreementincluding, for example, the longstanding economic ties between the
United States and Australia, their shared legal traditions, and the
confidence of their investors in operating in each others' markets-the

Development (UNCTAD), Investment Instruments Online, Bilateral Investment
Treaties, http://www.unctadxi.org/templates/DocSearch.aspx?id=779.
136.
See DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND TRADE, AUSTRALIA-UNITED
STATES FREE TRADE AGREEMENT:

ADVANCING AUSTRALIA'S

ECONOMIC FUTURE

4

(2004), http://www.dfat.gov.au/trade/negotiations/us-fta/ausftabrochure.pdf.
137.
See UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION, U.S.-AUSTRALIA
FREE TRADE
EFFECTS 99,

AGREEMENT: POTENTIAL ECONOMYWIDE AND SELECTED SECTORAL
101 (May 2004), http://hotdocs.usitc.gov/docs/pubs/2104f/pub3697.pdf

[hereinafter ITC REPORT].
138.
FAQs, supra note 5; see also AUSTRALIA DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
AND TRADE, THE AUSTRALIA-UNITED STATES FREE TRADE AGREEMENT (AUSFTA):
ADVANCING
AUSTRALIAN
INVESTMENT
AND
SERVICES
EXPORTS
5
(2004),

www.dfat.gov.autrade/negotiations/us-fta/fact-sheets/Services.pdf.
Significantly, the Agreement also does not allow for private investors to trigger
dispute settlement processes under its provisions to challenge government
decisions, known as 'Investor-State Dispute Settlement'.
Only the two
governments may initiate a dispute procedure if they belief the other party is
not complying with its obligations under the investment chapter of the
Agreement. This result recognises that both countries have established, robust
and sophisticated legal systems that provide adequate scope for both domestic
and foreign investors to pursue concerns about government actions.
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two countries agreed not to adopt procedures in the Agreement that
would allow investors to arbitrate disputes with governments. This
39
issue will be revisited if circumstances change.1

In neither the United States nor Australia, however, will these
"robust and sophisticated domestic legal systems' 140 get the chance to
hear claims under AUSFTA itself. 141 U.S. implementing legislation
for AUSFTA follows the same pattern as NAFTA's, l4 2 providing that
"[n]o person other than the United States... shall have any cause of
action or defense under the Agreement"'143 or "may challenge ... any
action or inaction by any department, agency, or other
instrumentality of the United States, any State, or any political
subdivision of a State, on the ground that such action or inaction is
inconsistent with the Agreement."'1 44 Australia's implementing
legislation 145 does not deal with this question explicitly, but it is well
established that the provisions of a treaty "do not form part of
Australian law unless those provisions have been validly incorporated
into our municipal law by statute" and that "a treaty which has not
been incorporated into our municipal law cannot operate as a direct
14 6
source of individual rights and obligations under that law."'
What Australia and the United States have created, then, is a
system for protecting foreign investors that depends entirely on

139.
Office of the United States Trade Representative, U.S.-Australia ETA
Summary of the Agreement (July 15, 2004), http://www.ustr.gov/TradeAgreements/
Bilateral/AustraliaFTA/US-AustraliaFTASummaryof.theAgreement.html.
It
appears that U.S. business interests were the strongest advocates of including an
investor-state provision. The U.S. International Trade Commission reported, "The U.S.
business community would have preferred that the FTA include an 'investor-state'
dispute resolution mechanism. Industry representatives view this as a significant
shortcoming of the agreement, and an important step back from previous FTAs and
Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) concluded by the United States." ITC REPORT,
supra note 137, at 105-06; see also JOINT STANDING COMMITTEE ON TREATIES,
PARLIAMENT OF AUSTRALIA, REPORT 61: THE AUSTRALIA-UNITED STATES FREE TRADE
AGREEMENT 52, http://www.aph.gov.au/house/committee/jsct/usafta/report/fullreport.pdf
("American business interests were pushing for investor-state dispute settlement.").
140.
FAQs, supra note 5.
141.
See AUSFTA, supra note 2, art. 21.15 ("Neither Party may provide for a
right of action under its domestic law against the other Party on the ground that a
measure of the other Party is inconsistent with this Agreement."). In fact, the
limitations on private parties invoking AUSFTA in domestic court go far beyond this.
See infra notes 142-46 and accompanying text.
142.
See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
143.
United States-Australia Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act, Pub.
L. No. 108-286, § 102(c)(1), 118 Stat. 919 (2004) (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 3805 note).
144.
Id. § 102(c)(2).
Like NAFTA's implementing legislation, the AUSFTA
Implementation Act also provides that U.S. law is to prevail in the event of a conflict
and that only the United States may bring suit to have a state law declared invalid
under the agreement. See id. § 102(a), (b)(2).
145.
US Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act 2004, c. 120 (Austl.),
availableat http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/consolact/uftaia2004363.
146.
Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v. Teoh (1995) 183 CLR 273,
286-87 (Austl.).
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diplomatic protection and resembles those in operation before the
advent of ICSID and the BITs. Indeed, in one respect, the agreement
is even more restrictive than earlier treaties, for breaches of AUSFTA
may not be raised in domestic courts, whereas the provisions of
earlier treaties could in at least some instances. 147 Instead, investors
will have to find proxies for their Chapter 11 claims in the domestic
laws of Australia and the United States, alleging a violation of the
U.S. Constitution's Fifth Amendment 148 or Article 51(xxxi) of the
Australian Constitution, 1 49 rather than an expropriation in violation
of AUSFTA Article 11.7. Only when an investor has exhausted these
domestic-law claims will its home state be able to raise the breach of
AUSFTA through the Chapter 21 process. 150 Even then, it is not
certain that the investor's home state will do so, for that state may
prefer to forgive the breach in the interests of smooth diplomatic
relations. 15 1
This system will undoubtedly protect the Australian and U.S.
governments from having to defend themselves against direct claims
from each other's investors. The direct claims they will not have to
face include those based on state and local measures, promoting
federalism. This has only been achieved, however, by making the
substantive provisions of AUSFTA largely unenforceable. Justice
Holmes once observed that "[1Jegal obligations that exist but cannot
be enforced are ghosts that are seen in the law but that are elusive to
the grasp."'1 52 AUSFTA Chapter 11 is a ghost.

IV. THE BEST OF BOTH WORLDS
One might reasonably argue that there is no need for investment
agreements between developed countries because those countries'
domestic legal systems already provide sufficient protections for

147.
See supra notes 72-76 and accompanying text.
148.
U.S. CONST. amend. V ("[N]or shall private property be taken for public use,
without just compensation.").
149.
Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act c. I, pt. V, §51 (xxxi) (granting
Parliament the power to acquire "property on just terms from any State or person for
any purpose in respect of which the Parliament has power to make laws").
150.
See supra note 129 and accompanying text.
151.
See supra notes 44-46 and accompanying text.
152.
Western Maid v. Thompson, 257 U.S. 419, 433 (1922); see also Richard B.
Lillich, The Diplomatic Protection of Nationals Abroad: An Elementary Principle of
International Law Under Attack, 69 AM. J. INT'L L. 359, 359 (1975) (quoting Western
Maid). Professor Lillich defended diplomatic protection as the only available means to
enforce State responsibility "until the international community grants alien claimants
access to effective international machinery guaranteeing third-party determination of
wealth deprivation disputes." Lillich, supra, at 364. Diplomatic protection may not be
the best means, however, particularly when its exercise seems unlikely and a
mechanism for direct claims is possible.
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investors. That is a fine argument for not putting investment
provisions in FTAs between developed countries at all, but in this
context it proves too much. If an agreement between developed
countries contains investment protections, those protections should
be enforceable. But how?
One may divide the inquiry into two parts. First, who should
have authority to enforce investment
protections? Should
enforcement be limited to the investor's home state, or should the
investor itself be allowed to press a claim? Second, if the investor
should be allowed to press its own claim, what is the proper forum to
hear the dispute in the first instance? Should agreements between
developed countries waive the local remedies rule and allow foreign
investors to proceed immediately to international arbitration, or
should they require such investors to exhaust domestic remedies?
This Article argues that investors should be allowed to bring
direct claims to enforce investment agreements between developed
countries, but that they should first be required to bring those claims
in the domestic courts of the host state.
A. The Advantages of Direct Claims
Diplomatic protection has strengths and weaknesses. One
strength lies in screening out frivolous or dishonest claims. A U.S.
State Department official once observed: "The tendency of individual
claimants to press unsound claims-for any loss sustained in a
1 53
foreign country-and in grossly exaggerated form is well known.
An espousing state, by contrast, is constrained by the fear of losing
credibility and thereby jeopardizing other claims that it might wish to
make. 154 On the other hand, this screening role imposes a substantial
burden on states, which "are pressured to prosecute, or at least
investigate, a great number of frivolous claims that would not
otherwise be pressed if the responsibility and cost of prosecution
1 55
remained with the individual investor.'
Although diplomatic protection spares foreign investors the
expense of prosecuting their own claims, it generally does not serve
them well. Governments will often be tempted to sacrifice an
investor's interests "to some overriding policy of fostering friendly

153.

8 MARJORIE M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1223 (1967)

(quoting Memorandum prepared by Marjorie M. Whiteman, Assistant Legaf Advisor,
Department of State, "Comments on Report on 'International Responsibility', by Dr.
Garcia-Amador, Special Rapporteur, International Law Commission," (Dec. 18, 1956)).
154.
Id.
155.
Charles N. Brower & Lee A. Steven, Who Then Should Judge?: Developing
the InternationalRule of Law under NAFTA Chapter 11, 2 CHI. J. INT'L L. 193, 197

(2001); see also Lauterpacht, supra note 40, at 458 (suggesting that "the heavy cost of
international litigation would act as an effective deterrent against rash or malicious
recourse to the machinery put at the disposal of private persons").
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relations. ' 156 As a former Legal Advisor to the Department of State
candidly admitted, "the Department's decision with respect to
espousal is likely to be influenced, not only by the merits of the case,
but by the Department's concern for offending a foreign state and
'157
creating a potential irritant in its dealings with that state.
Finally, diplomatic protection tends to increase "international
friction. '158 One need not agree with Professor Brierly that equating
the economic interests of private parties with those of the entire
nation is the greatest threat to peace in the modern world1 59 to
recognize that converting private claims into diplomatic disputes
16 0
injects unnecessary irritants into foreign relations.
In comparison, direct claims offer a number of advantages.
"Because the most directly affected parties are involved, both the
costs and potential rewards of the process fall to the persons or
entities that control it. '' 16 1 This promotes not just sensible choices
about whether to bring or to defend a claim, but also "efficient
decisions about the design and subsequent conduct of arbitral
proceedings.' 1 6 2 Most importantly, allowing direct claims tends to
depoliticize the settlement of investment disputes, allowing foreign
investors to press their claims without worrying that government
officials may sacrifice them in the interests of foreign relations; it also
smoothes those relations by allowing home states to remain neutral
in disputes between their nationals and other states. As Professor
Caron has noted, the trend towards direct claims "is desirable
politically because it reduces the significance of the state as a world
actor in areas where the sensitivities of the state need not be
63
implicated.'

156.
Jessup, supra note 46, at 908.
157.
The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Courts and Administrative Practice, S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 103d Cong. 83-84
(1994) (testimony of Abraham D. Sofaer) [hereinafter Sofaer Testimony]; see also David
J. Bederman, InternationalLaw Advocacy and its Discontents, 2 CHI. J. INT'L L. 475,
483-84 (2001) ("Individual grievances have tended to be subordinated to the greater
good of the state in its pursuit of common foreign policy objectives."); Brower & Steven,
supra note 155, at 197 ("[T]he exigencies of time, money, political priorities, and the
whims of individual bureaucrats may cause a government to downgrade, or even
ignore, meritorious claims.").
158.
Lauterpacht, supra note 40, at 454.
159.
See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
160.
See Sofaer Testimony, supra note 157, at 83-84. Problems with diplomatic
protection that arose historically from an imbalance of power, see supra note 43 and
accompanying text, do not seem as pronounced in the context of disputes between two
developed countries.
161.
Caron, supra note 49, at 155.
162.
Id.
163.
Id. at 154-55.
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B. Requiring Exhaustion of Local Remedies
While allowing foreign investors to bring direct claims has a
number of advantages, there is no reason the initial forum for such
claims must be an international tribunal. Decisions to waive the local
remedies rule and allow immediate recourse to international
arbitration have been made in situations where the courts of a host
state were not trusted, 164 and the same path need not be followed
where both states have well-functioning domestic court systems. It is
also worth recalling that in the United States, at least, there is a long
history of allowing private parties to raise claims under commercial
treaties in domestic courts. 165 If investment agreements between
developed countries were enforceable in domestic courts, and if
foreign investors were required to exhaust their local remedies before
resorting to an international tribunal, a number of advantages would
be gained: (1) sovereignty would be better protected than under
NAFTA Chapter 11, (2) the appellate processes of domestic courts
would be able to correct errors, and (3) a single forum would be able
to hear and resolve all claims arising from an investment dispute.
After discussing these advantages below, this Article responds briefly
to a few anticipated objections.
1. Preserving Sovereignty
Chief among the advantages to the host state would be the
preservation of sovereignty. Sovereignty, in this context, does not
mean complete freedom to do as a state wishes, for such freedom is
inconsistent with the notion of investor protection by treaty. Rather it
means respect for the internal processes of the state, and for its
courts in particular "on the assumption that they are capable of doing
justice.' 1 66 Sovereignty would be best preserved by requiring that an
investor present not just its domestic-law claims to a domestic court,
but its international claims as well. 167 Domestic courts are perfectly

164.
165.

See supra notes 52-55 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 72-76 and accompanying text.

166.

BORCHARD, supra note 23, at 817.

167.
Most international tribunals have held that if a party can raise its
international claims before a domestic tribunal, then it must do so in order to exhaust
its domestic remedies. See Certain Norwegian Loans (Fr. v. Nor.), 1957 I.C.J. 9, 41-42
(July 6) (separate opinion of Judge Lauterpacht) (stating that French bondholders
should have raised international law claims in Norwegian courts); Finnish Ships
Arbitration (Fin. v. U.K.), 3 R.I.A.A. 1479, 1502 (1934) ("[Alll the contentions of fact
and propositions of law which are brought forward by the claimant
Government ...must have been investigated and adjudicated upon by the municipal
Courts .. ").But see Elettronica Sicula S.p.A. (ELSI) (U.S. v. Italy), 1989 I.C.J. 15,
45-46 (July 20) (holding that raising only domestic-law claims was sufficient to satisfy
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capable of handling international claims, 168 and they will be more
"capable of doing justice" and thus of avoiding recourse to an
international tribunal if they have jurisdiction over all of the legal
claims that a dispute may generate.
Domestic courts may be particularly useful in avoiding recourse
to international tribunals when breaches of the treaty arise from the
actions of relatively low-level officials, particularly those outside of
the federal hierarchy. 169 In Loewen, for example, the NAFTA Chapter
11 tribunal found "that the conduct of the trial by the trial judge was
so flawed that it constituted a miscarriage of justice amounting to a
manifest injustice as that expression is understood in international
law.' 7 0 The only way for the United States to correct this breach of
NAFTA was through domestic appeals, and the Loewen tribunal
sensibly required exhaustion. 171 "[I]t would be very strange if a State
were to be confronted with liability for a breach of international law
committed by its magistrate or low-ranking judicial officer when
domestic avenues of appeal are not pursued," the tribunal noted,
because "domestic appeal or review, if pursued, might have avoided
any liability on the part of the State."'1 72 Although Loewen's
exhaustion requirement is limited to judicial decisions, 173 requiring
exhaustion makes just as much sense for other measures that violate
investment agreements. 1 74 As Professor Borchard noted nearly a
century ago, "if the injury is committed by an individual or minor
official, the exhaustion of local remedies is necessary to make certain
that the wrongful act or denial of justice is the deliberate act of the

the local remedies rule so long as "the substance of the claim .. . is essentially the
same").
168.
See infra notes 202-04 and accompanying text.
169.
This is a problem that stretches beyond the context of investment treaties,
as efforts to ensure state and local compliance with the Vienna Convention on Consular
Relations have vividly demonstrated. See Jogi v. Voges, 425 F.3d 367 (7th Cir. 2005)
(allowing suit for damages against state officials who violated the Vienna Convention);
Medellin v. Dretke, 371 F.3d 270, 279-80 (5th Cir. 2004), cert. dismissed as
improvidently granted, 125 S. Ct. 2088 (2005) (denying certificate of appealability to
raise breach of the Vienna Convention).
170.
Loewen Group, Inc. v. United States, Award (NAFTA Ch. 11 Arb. Trib.
June 26, 2003), 42 I.L.M. 811, 819 (2003).
171.
See id. at 834-46.
172.
See id. at 837.
173.
For non.judicial breaches of Chapter 11, tribunals have held that NAFTA
Article 1121 waives the local remedies rule. See supra notes 105-06 and accompanying
text.
174.
See Andrea K. Bjorklund, Waiver and the Exhaustion of Local Remedies
Rule in NAFTA Jurisprudence,in NAFTA INVESTMENT LAW AND ARBITRATION: PAST
ISSUES, CURRENT PRACTICE, FUTURE PROSPECTS 253, 285 (Todd Weiler ed. 2004)
("From a policy perspective ... it is difficult to distinguish the desireability of requiring
a decision of the highest body within a court system from requiring a final decision
from the highest official in an administrative system.").
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State.' 17 5 To the extent such injuries can be redressed within the
domestic court system, sovereignty is preserved.
In federal systems, like those of the United States and Australia,
176
preserving sovereignty also means preserving state sovereignty.
Again, this does not mean that the state should be shielded from
scrutiny under the treaty, but rather that such scrutiny should occur
if possible in a familiar forum where the state has the best
opportunity to present its case. In the United States, the issue is
complicated by the Supreme Court's Eleventh Amendment
jurisprudence. The Eleventh Amendment shields states from being
sued without their consent under federal law, either in federal 177 or
state courts. 178 The Eleventh Amendment, however, permits suits
against local governments 179 as well as suits against state officers for
injunctive relief. 80° At present, state governments do not seem
disposed to waive their immunity to suits by foreign investors,' 8 ' but
this stance is shortsighted. Requiring foreign investors to bring treaty
claims against the state in state court first 8 2 may well be a better
way of preserving state sovereignty than to allow the same claims to
proceed directly to an international tribunal. A state that consents to
be sued directly may defend itself directly. The domestic court would

175.

BORCHARD, supra note 23, at 817.

176.
For accounts of the Australian experience reconciling treaty obligations
with federalism, see Bill Campbell, The Implementation of Treaties in Australia, in
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND AUSTRALIAN FEDERALISM 132-59 (Brian R. Opeskin &
Donald R. Rothwell eds., 1997), and Brian R. Opeskin & Donald R. Rothwell, The
Impact of Treaties on AustralianFederalism, 27 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 1 (1995).
177.
See Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996) (holding that the
Eleventh Amendment prohibits Congress from holding a state liable in federal court).
178.
See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999) (concluding that Congress did not
have the power under the U.S. Constitution to hold states liable in state court for
private claims for damages).
On the question of whether the Court's Eleventh
Amendment decisions extend to claims under treaties, see Carlos Manuel V~zquez,
Treaties and the Eleventh Amendment, 42 VA. J. INT'L L. 713 (2002), and Susan
Bandes, Treaties, Sovereign Immunity, and "The Plan of the Convention" 42 VA. J.
INT'L L. 743 (2002).
179.
Lincoln County v. Luning, 133 U.S. 529, 530 (1890) (stating that the
jurisdiction of the courts to hear suits against counties is "beyond question"); see, e.g.,
Asakura v. City of Seattle, 265 U.S. 332 (1924) (applying the U.S.-Japan Treaty of
Commerce and Navigation in a suit against the city).
180.
Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908) (enjoining an officer of the state); see,
e.g., Jordan v. Tashiro, 278 U.S. 123 (1928) (applying the U.S.-Japan Treaty of
Commerce and Navigation in a mandamus action against state officials). If investment
treaties were judicially enforceable, they could also be raised in disputes between
private parties. In a situation like Loewen, for example, the foreign investor would be
able to challenge the punitive damages verdict on appeal not just as a violation of due
process but as a violation of NAFTA.
181.
See NCSL Free Trade Policy, supra note 123 ("Provisions must be made to
deny any new private right of action in U.S. courts or before international dispute
resolution panels based on international trade or investment agreements . . . ").
182.
A state would not have to consent additionally to be sued in federal court.
See supra notes 177-78 and accompanying text.
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be more familiar terrain, and if the state or locality loses, there is the
possibility of appeal, which is lacking under NAFTA.183
2. Allowing Appeals
Because domestic court systems allow appeals, they are more
likely to get the answers right in the end.18 4 Despite the utmost good
faith, judges and arbitrators all make mistakes. Arbitrators'
mistakes, though, are largely insulated from review. Their awards
may not be set aside for mere errors of fact or law, but only for more
fundamental flaws in the arbitral process.' 8 5 Within a domestic court
system, errors of law and fact may be corrected on appeal. Of course,
additional appeals mean additional costs, both in money and in
time.' 8 6 But from the host state's point of view, when important
public policies like environmental protection are at stake, additional
efforts to get the answer right are likely worth the costs.
Allowing appeals may also help to discourage weak and frivolous
claims, which was one of the principal advantages of diplomatic
protection.' 8 7 Any system of dispute resolution that requires an
investor to bear its own costs of litigation will perform this function to
some extent.' 8 8 But a domestic court system with its process of
appeals should perform this function better, not because it is more
expensive but because investors with weak and frivolous claims will
see that their chances of prevailing are lower. "An investor that
doubts its chances of success in a domestic appeal may nevertheless
be willing to gamble on getting a sympathetic Chapter 11 tribunal

183.
For more on the advantages of an appellate system, see infra notes 184-89
and accompanying text.
184.

See

W. MICHAEL REISMAN,

SYSTEMS OF CONTROL

IN INTERNATIONAL

ADJUDICATION AND ARBITRATION 4 (1992) ("It is arguable that the more hierarchical
layers of protection a bureaucracy has, the more likely it is to get things right.");
Bjorklund, supranote 174, at 285 ("[B]y the time an issue reaches an appellate court, it
is normally more crystallized and the chances of it being decided correctly are
greater.").
185.
The precise grounds are contained in the arbitration law of the jurisdiction
that is asked to set aside or to decline enforcement of an award. Most arbitration laws,
however, conform to Article V of the New York Convention, which lists limited grounds
for refusing enforcement. See United Nations Convention on the Recognition and
Enforcement of Arbitral Awards, art. V, June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S.
38.
186.
REISMAN, supra note 184, at 4-5.
187.
See supra notes 153-54 and accompanying text.
188.
See Lauterpacht, supra note 40, at 458 ("[The heavy cost of international
litigation would act as an effective deterrent against rash or malicious recourse to the
machinery put at the disposal of private persons."); Brower & Steven, supra note 155,
at 197 ("[A] great number of frivolous claims ...would not otherwise be pressed if the
responsibility and cost of prosecution remained with the individual investor").
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whose decision will be largely insulated from review."'18 9 An investor
faced with the prospect of appeals to correct an aberrant initial
decision is more likely to forego its weak or frivolous claims.
3. Providing a Single Forum
A final set of advantages from requiring exhaustion arises from
the fact domestic and international claims are often intertwined. The
system created by NAFTA Chapter 11 requires an investor to at some
point choose between its domestic and international claims, because
both claims cannot be raised in the same forum. 190 This choice is
fraught with peril. In Waste Management, for example, a U.S.
investor was faced with repeated non-payment of invoices under a
concession agreement by a Mexican city and its guarantor, a stateowned bank. 19 1 It tried to pursue its domestic-law claims in domestic
courts and arbitral tribunals and a Chapter 11 claim before a NAFTA
tribunal, but the NAFTA tribunal dismissed the claim because the
investor had not given up its domestic remedies. 192 After the investor
abandoned its domestic remedies and refiled its Chapter 11 claims, a
second NAFTA tribunal ruled that the city's breaches of the
concession agreement amounted only to violations of domestic law,
over which the tribunal lacked jurisdiction. 193 Clearly investors like
Waste Management would benefit from being able to raise both
94
international and domestic claims in a single forum.
There would also be a benefit to the host state to the extent that
it was spared from having to defend the same measure in two
different forums. NAFTA allows investors up to three years to pursue
domestic claims in domestic courts before they must waive those
remedies as a precondition to filing a Chapter 11 claim. 195 In two
cases filed against the United States, Canadian investors took
advantage of this requirement and filed suits in federal court
challenging on domestic law grounds the same measure they
196
subsequently alleged to be violations of NAFTA.

189.
William S. Dodge, Loewen v. United States: Trials and Errors Under
NAFTA ChapterEleven, 52 DEPAUL L. REV. 563, 575 (2002).
190.
See supra notes 109-13 and accompanying text.
191.
See Waste Mgmt., Inc. v. Mexico, Award (NAFTA Ch. 11 Arb. Trib. June 2,
2000), 40 I.L.M. 56 (2001).
192.
Id. at 66-70.
193.
See Waste Mgmt., Inc. v. Mexico, Final Award, (NAFTA Ch. 11 Arb. Trib.
Apr. 30, 2004), 43 I.L.M. 967 (2004).
194.
Cf. Loewen Group, Inc. v. United States, Award, (NAFTA Ch. 11 Arb. Trib.
June 26, 2003), 42 I.L.M. 811, 837 (2003) ("[I]n the general run of cases, domestic
appeal or review would offer more wide.ranging review as they are not confined to
breaches of international law.").
195.
See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
196.
See, e.g., Grand River Enters. Six Nations, Ltd. v. Pryor, No. 02 Civ.
5068(JFK), 2003 WL 22232974 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2003), vacated in part on
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Finally, in the event that domestic courts were unable to resolve
the dispute and resort to an international tribunal became necessary,
the international tribunal would benefit from the domestic court's
development of the facts and the law, particularly those domestic-law
issues on which the tribunal lacks expertise. 197 In Metalclad, for
example, whether denial of a construction permit violated NAFTA
Article 1105 depended in part on whether the municipality had
authority under Mexican law over hazardous waste matters. The
tribunal held that the municipality lacked such authority, 198 but it
clearly would have benefited from an analysis of the issue by the
Mexican courts. 199 In Azinian, by contrast, the question of whether a
municipality had grounds under Mexican law to repudiate a
concession contract had been adjudicated by the Mexican courts, and
the tribunal was able to rely on their decisions in rejecting the
investor's expropriation claim. 20 0 Of course, the domestic court's
decision would not bind the tribunal even on questions of domestic
law, 201 but the court's analysis would improve the tribunal's
understanding of that law.
4. Responses to Some Anticipated Objections
Against these advantages of requiring first resort to domestic
courts with respect to both domestic law and treaty claims, may be
set a number of objections, which this Article will briefly address.
First, it might be argued that domestic courts lack expertise in

reconsideration,No. 02 Civ. 5068 (JFK), 2004 WL 1594869 (S.D.N.Y. July 15, 2004)
(challenging state laws on commerce clause, antitrust, equal protection, due process,
and First Amendment grounds); Glamis Imperial Corp. v. U.S. Dep't of the Interior,
No. Civ. A. 01-530 (RMU) 2001 WL 1704305 (D.D.C. 2001) (arguing that failure to
approve mining operation violated federal regulations, statutes, and the Establishment
Clause of the First Amendment).
197.
See Certain Norwegian Loans (Fr. v. Nor.), 1957 I.C.J. 9, 97 (July 6)
(dissenting opinion of Judge Read) ("It is important to obtain the ruling of local courts
with regard to the issues of fact and law involved, before the international aspects are
dealt with by an international tribunal.").
198.
See Metalclad Corp. v. Mexico, Award, (NAFTA Ch. 11 Arb. Trib. Aug. 30,
2000), 40 I.L.M. 36, 48-49 (2001).
199.
Metalclad and Mexico both submitted expert opinions on the question, but
predictably, those opinions did not agree. See id. at 48.
200.
Azinian v. Mexico, Award, (NAFTA Ch. 11 Arb. Trib. Nov. 1, 1999), 39
I.L.M. 537, 551-53 (2000).
201.
Under customary international law, the decisions of domestic courts are not
binding on international tribunals. See, e.g., Amco v. Indonesia, Award (Nov. 20, 1984),
1 ICSID Rep. 413, 460 (1993), sustained in relevant part, Amco v. Indonesia (Decision
on the Application for Annulment, May 16, 1986), 1 ICSID Rep. 509, 526-27 (1993)
("An international tribunal is not bound to follow the result of a national court."). See
generally Dodge, supra note 105, at 365-70.
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international law. 20 2 As a general matter, it is true that domestic
judges have less expertise in international matters than international
arbitrators, but that does not mean that domestic judges are
incapable of interpreting and applying international law. U.S. judges
have long been called upon to interpret and apply the provisions of
commercial treaties protecting investors. 20 3 The same is true of
customary international law. 20 4 Moreover, domestic judges are liable
to have a correspondingly greater expertise than international
tribunals on issues of domestic law. Given the advantages discussed
above in having all claims resolved in a single forum and the
sovereignty interests in having the initial forum be a domestic one,
the expertise objection should not carry much weight.
A second objection is that domestic courts in different states
might interpret the provisions of a treaty differently, resulting in a
lack of uniformity. Again, this objection has some merit, but less than
meets the eye. First, U.S. courts give "considerable weight" to the
court decisions of other states construing the same treaty, 20 5 even if
they do not always follow them. 20 6 Second, one must bear in mind
that the interpretations of arbitral tribunals are not always
consistent either. 20 7 Finally, the state parties to a treaty may promote
20 8
uniformity, either by presenting their views to the domestic courts,

202.
Jack J. Coe, Jr., Domestic Court Control of Investment Awards: Necessary
Evil or Achilles Heel Within NAFTA and the Proposed FTAA?, 19 J. INT'L ARB. 185,
202-03 & n.120 (2002). In the context of domestic court review of Chapter 11 awards,
Professor Coe has referred to the domestic courts' lack of expertise as the problem of
"expertise inversion." Id.
203.
See supra notes 72-76 and accompanying text.
204.
See The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900) ("International law is
part of our law, and must be ascertained and administered by the courts of justice of
appropriate jurisdiction as often as questions of right depending upon it are duly
presented for their determination.").
205.
Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 404 (1985).
206.
See, e.g., Olympic Airways v. Husain, 540 U.S. 644, 655 n.9 (2004)
(declining to defer to other signatories' interpretation of the term "accident" in Article
17 of the Warsaw Convention).
207.
To address this problem, a number of writers have suggested establishing
an appellate body for investment disputes. See, e.g., Susan D. Franck, The Legitimacy
Crisis in Investment Treaty Arbitration:PrivatizingPublic InternationalLaw Through
Inconsistent Decisions, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1521 (2005); Charles H. Brower, II,
Structure, Legitimacy, and NAFTA's Investment Chapter, 36 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L.
37, 91-92 (2003); William S. Dodge, Investment Disputes and NAFTA Chapter Eleven:
Remarks, 95 AM. SoCY INT'L L. PROC. 207 (2001).
208.
See Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176, 185 (1982)
("Although not conclusive, the meaning attributed to treaty provisions by the
Government agencies charged with their negotiation and enforcement is entitled to
great weight.").
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or through more formal mechanisms that allow the state parties to
20 9
issue binding interpretations of a treaty's text.
A third objection is that creating two classes of countries-those
whose legal systems have to be exhausted, and those whose legal
systems do not-is insulting to less developed countries and
diplomatically awkward. But in truth these two classes of countries
already exist. BITs currently allow investors from developed
countries to avoid the domestic courts of less developed countries,
while the AUSFTA experience shows that developed countries are
unlikely repeat the mistake of NAFTA and allow themselves to be
sued directly, at least without requiring exhaustion first. Providing a
meaningful forum for direct claims against developed countries
would, in fact, lessen the difference in treatment between developed
and less developed countries that currently exists. One might ease
the diplomatic awkwardness by including in investment treaties a
provision similar to Article 26 of the ICSID Convention that would
allow each country to decide for itself whether to require
exhaustion.2 10 The United States, Canada, and Australia might
decide to require exhaustion, thinking that such a requirement would
be unlikely to discourage foreign investors. Less developed countries
might strike the balance differently. The important point is that if
each country were allowed to choose for itself, it would have little
cause to complain of differential treatment.

V. CONCLUSION

Allowing direct claims by investors offers a number of
advantages. It depoliticizes investment disputes to the ultimate
benefit of both states and investors. But requiring investors to bring
their claims-domestic and international-in domestic court first also
offers a number of advantages. It preserves the sovereignty of the
state, provides for the correction of errors, and allows for the
resolution of all claims in a single forum. In the context of investment
agreements between developed countries, it should be possible to
combine the advantages of direct claims with those of the local

209.
See, e.g., NAFTA, supra note 3, art. 1131(2) ("An interpretation by the
Commission of a provision of this Agreement shall be binding on a Tribunal established
under this Section.").
210.
ICSID Convention, supra note 48, art. 26, 4 I.L.M. at 536 ("A Contracting
State may require the exhaustion of local administrative or judicial remedies as a
condition of its consent to arbitration under this Convention."). As noted above, this
option has been rarely utilized. See supra note 52 and accompanying text. Such a
provision would also provide a solution to the problem posed by agreements like
NAFTA or the proposed Free Trade Area of the Americas to which both developed and
developing countries are party, by allowing some states to require exhaustion of their
legal systems and other states to waive exhaustion.
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remedies rule. Developed states need not choose between NAFTA's
world of immediate resort to international tribunals and AUSFTA's
world of ghostly protection for foreign investors. It is possible to have
the best of both worlds.

